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I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 2004, New York City officials temporarily enjoined a particular
mohel1 from directly applying oral suction to babies’ penises, an ultra Orthodox
Jewish circumcision ritual known as metzitzah be’peh. Three infants circumcised by
the mohel were infected with the Herpes Simplex Virus (HSV).2 Metzitzah be’peh is
an ancient Orthodox ritual procedure used to stop the bleeding following an infant’s
circumcision.3 In November of 2004, one of a set of twin infants died from

1

Mohels are rabbis specially trained in aseptic techniques, the circumcision procedure, and
have received rabbinical recognition. See 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 567, 570 (1st ed.,
1994).
2

Id.

3

Rabbinical Council of America, Bris Milah and Metzitza B’Peh: Policy Statement (Mar.
1, 2005), available at http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=100546.
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complications due to the HSV infection.4 In 2003, another infant had been
diagnosed with herpes following a ritual circumcision by the same mohel.5 And in
December of 2005, the New York City health department revealed that two more
infants were infected with HSV following oral suction rituals. The City’s statement
did not indicate whether it was the same mohel from the earlier three infections.6 Of
the two newly released cases, one of the infants suffered permanent brain damage.7
Following the tragic death of this infant and the permanent lifelong infection of
the others, New York City officials began to question one mohel’s HSV status.8
Some Orthodox mohels within the Jewish community still perform the ritual which is
loosely referred to as oral-suction.9 During an inconclusive month-long investigative
process in 2005, the New York City health department temporarily enjoined the
mohel suspected of transmitting herpes to the infants during metzitzah be’peh.10
Compelled by the possibility that the potentially HSV infected mohel’s continued
oral contact with infants’ circumcised genitalia could result in the fatal transmission
of HSV to more babies, a New York court temporarily ordered the mohel to cease
and desist from performing metzitzah be’peh on anymore infants.11
The state action of enjoining the mohel from practicing the ancient ritual and
mandating medical testing bred vicious First Amendment based attacks against New
York officials.12 The mohel’s attorney and other advocates adamantly argued that
denying or interfering with anyone’s right to exercise metzitzah be’peh, a religious
ritual, directly violates the United States Constitution.13 After several months of
investigation, blood work, medical exams, and splintered political and religious
4
Debra Nussbaum Cohen, Should Mohelim Be Supervised, NEW YORK JEWISH WEEK, Feb.
11, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 4709743.
5

Id.

6

Thomas R. Frieden, An Open Letter to the Jewish Community from the New York City
Health Commissioner (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dohdowloads/
pdf/cd/05md46.
7

Id.

8

Joyce Purnick, Metro Matters; Taking a Stand on a Rite with Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 448719.
9

See Andy Newman, City Questions Circumcision Ritual After Baby Dies, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13434866. The subject of the investigation is
renowned and trusted Rabbi Yitzchok Fischer.
10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Debra Nussbaum Cohen, City Risking Babies’ Lives with Brit Policy: Health Experts.
NEW YORK JEWISH WEEK, Oct. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 20900436. The city later
withdrew its lawsuit on September 15, 2005 and assigned the investigation to an Orthodox
rabbinical court.
13
Protesting any government action, Rabbi David Niederman, a member of the United
Jewish Organization, asserts there is insufficient medical evidence to “justify” even so much
as a public warning when the challenged ritual is performed thousands of times and has only
resulted in 5 documented cases since 2003. See David B. Caruso, Jewish Rite Death Spurs
Guidelines, JOURNAL GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 2087582.

2004-05]

TOO MUCH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM?

299

debates both within and outside of the Jewish community, the county, the state and
the city moved to dismiss all outstanding court orders and its pending civil lawsuit.
The underlying issue in the New York mohel’s case has yet to be resolved. The
infected infants are not the first instances to prompt questions regarding health and
safety concerns surrounding metzitzah be’peh.14 The city-wide statement issued by
the health department in December 2005 acknowledged other instances of infants
becoming infected with HSV in connection with metzitzah be’peh.15 In particular,
the statement cites to the recently released medical study confirming the high risk of
HSV associated with oral-genital suction.16 Thus, until mohels cease to apply direct
mouth to penis contact during the ritual, this highly disturbing and controversial
issue will remain unresolved and continue to generate heated debate.
The Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution’s First Amendment
protects the free exercise of religion, and the United States Supreme Court has
included within the clause’s scope the repugnant practice of animal sacrifice.17 As
such, cities cannot even ban the distasteful religious practice of slaughtering innocent
animals when it is part of a religious sacrament.18 On the other hand, Congress has
enacted a federal statute banning female circumcision, a heinous procedure
performed by certain cultural and religious groups.19 And some states are beginning
to eliminate religious shield laws which have had the effect of insulating parents
from criminal abuse and neglect prosecution when denial of medical treatment for
their children is grounded within their religious beliefs.20
In the future, individual cities or states should combat the significant health risk
posed to infants by metzitzah be’peh by enacting affirmative statutes similar to the
Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1996. It should be expected
that parents may desire to bring tort claims against infected mohels who permanently
injure or kill their children by negligently or intentionally performing oral suction
14

Jim Rutenburg & Andy Newman, Mayor Balances Hasidic Ritual Against Fears for
Babies’ Health, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 326275. The civil suit
initiated in a New York court by the State of New York Health Department was dismissed just
prior to the mayoral election in 2005. The Orthodox Jewish community is a large voting bloc,
and it has been rumored that the State’s agreement to dismiss the pending action in September
and turn the investigation and regulation of the issue over to the Jewish community was
politically grounded. Since Mayor Bloomberg’s re-election, the failure of the Rabbis to meet
a December deadline to provide the New York City health department with results from their
investigation has prompted the city’s renewed vigor against metzitzah be’peh.
See also Purnick, supra note 8 for further discussion on the political situation.
15

See infra Sect. IV. A 2004 medical study published in Pediatrics identified the growing
concerns and correlations between metzitzah be’peh and HSV infection.
16

Frieden, supra note 6.

17

See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

18

B. Gesundheit et al., Neonatal Genital Herpes Simplex Virus Type I Infection After
Jewish Ritual Circumcision: Modern Medicine and Religious Tradition. 114 PEDIATRICS 259
(2004), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/114/2/e259 (last
visited Dec. 15, 2006).
19

U.S. CONST. Amend. I; see also Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531.

20

18 U.S.C.S. § 116 (2005). See also infra Sect. IV for further discussion.
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despite HSV status.21 Does the Constitution absolutely protect the free exercise of
oral-genital suction when it threatens the health and safety of human beings,
particularly infants? And does the Constitution bar parents from having any remedy
for the lifelong physical, emotional, and financial damage that may potentially result
from the negligent HSV transmission through metzitzah be’peh?
This article focuses on the controversial issue of state interference with the
Orthodox Jewish practice, a topic recently at the forefront in New York City. Until
the government recognizes its duty to provide affirmative regulation of metzitzah
be’peh to protect the compelling health interest of infants, thousands of infants will
continue to be at risk of contracting potentially fatal neonatal HSV without any
available remedy or criminal liability. In section II, the history and religious
significance of metzitzah be’peh is summarized for a better understanding of the
strong religious beliefs protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Section III identifies
the damaging and permanent nature of HSV by illustrating the range of symptoms,
detrimental effects, and virulence of the virus. Section IV offers a short discussion
of the relatively recent medical studies which conclusively correlate a high risk of
HSV infection with metzitzah be’peh, evidence of New York City’s compelling
interest to affirmatively regulate or ban the religious ritual of oral-genital suction.
Next, section V explores the present state of the case law surrounding the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. This section addresses the analogous judicial
fork in the road where the current issue has been temporarily left to idle based on
two very different directions taken in the most recent Free Exercise cases from the
United States Supreme Court. Section VI discusses how the modern trend of
governmental regulations intersecting with religious freedom offers insight to
support necessary government regulation of metzitzah be’peh. In conclusion, section
VII explores the city’s proposed solution and the solution’s ineffectiveness and
inability to protect infants from the incurable and potentially fatal herpes virus.
II. METZITZAH BE’PEH: THE ANCIENT ORTHODOX JEWISH RITUAL
Berit milah is a traditional Jewish circumcision ritual.22 The ritual is symbolic of
a covenant with God.23 Circumcision itself is a prehistoric procedure, one of the
oldest operations on record performed by man that was only later adopted for
medical purposes.24 After circumcising himself, the biblical Abraham then
performed the procedure on all of the males in his household, his sons Ishmael and
Isaac, and his slaves.25 The Encyclopaedia Judaica references Genesis 17:11-12 as
the originating source of the ritual; the section reads: “Every male among you shall
be circumcised. And ye shall be circumcised in the flesh of your foreskin, and it
shall be a token of a covenant betwixt Me and you. And he that is eight days old
21

See infra Sect. VIa.

22

As of June 8, 2006, there is no indication or evidence as to whether or not parents of
infected Jewish infants have raised private claims for injuries or wrongful death.
23

See generally ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 1. This source provides a detailed
history of circumcision as it originated throughout early history.
24
25

Id. at 567.

Id. It should be noted that circumcision is a widely debated procedure throughout the
world.
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shall be circumcised among you, every male throughout your generations.”26 Failure
to observe the command is believed to result in the punishment of being “cut off”
from one’s kind.27
Reformed Jewish believers (non-orthodox) may still have their sons circumcised,
but the procedure is typically done by a surgeon in a hospital, sometimes with a
Rabbi present to say the appropriate prayers to complete the ritual, or for some
without a Rabbi or ceremony at all.28 The more traditional orthodox bris takes place
in the home, hospital, or synagogue, and is performed by mohelim, rabbis specially
trained in aseptic techniques, the circumcision procedure, and who have received
rabbinical recognition.29 There are a number of specific rules that relate to the timing
of the circumcision for healthy babies, babies born via cesarean section, infants
without foreskins, etc., and the elaborate rules demonstrate the importance and depth
of the rooted tradition.30
Circumcision is not a procedure limited to the Jewish culture.31 In fact, parents of
children in American hospitals are presented with the option of circumcising their
sons or not.32 The common medical procedure has no religious basis and is
performed by doctors with the assistance of anesthesia, acetaminophen, and sterile
medical equipment. However, circumcision is not viewed by the majority of Jewish
believers as a medical procedure.33 Berit milah has an established ancient religious
foundation and is intended to perpetuate the bond between God and the Jews.34 In
addition to the bris, some Orthodox Jews still perform metzitzah be’peh, commonly
described as “oral-genital suction,” as a means to stop the bleeding of a circumcised
infant’s penis.35
The ritual Berit milah has three distinct components.36 First, the mohel excises
the outer part of the prepuce.37 Second, the inner lining of the foreskin is cut.38 And
26

Id.

27

Id. (citing Genesis 21:4).

28

ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 1.

29

Id. at 571.

30

Id.

31

See id. at 570, describing the various rules, their deviations, exceptions for holidays and
variances, etc.
32

Id. at 568-69.

33
R.S. Van Howe et al., Involuntary Circumcision: The Legal Issues, 83 BJU INT’L 63
(1999), available at www.cirp.org/library/legal/vanhowe5/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
Seventy to ninety percent of neonate males in America are circumcised.
34
There is an ongoing debate over whether the ritual is required by Jewish law or is merely
a medical procedure. The majority of Jewish people have abandoned direct oral-genital
suction, but there are still some that believe it is mandated by Jewish law. The debate began in
the mid-19th century in Europe when the practice of metzitzah be’peh was linked to
transmission of tuberculosis via mouth to penis contact. See Caruso, supra note 13.
35

See ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 1, at 567.

36

Id. at 572. The ritual is also representative of a covenant between the male infant and

God.
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finally, blood is sucked from the wound.39 Before medical devices and advances in
technology, the most appropriate and accepted method for sucking the blood from
the wound was with oral-genital contact.40 This part of the ritual is metzitzah be’peh.
“Toward the middle of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, cases of
syphilis, tuberculosis, and diphtheria occurring in infants were ascribed to infection
from mohelim using this method of suction.”41 Over time, health concerns within the
Jewish community has given rise to changes, variations, and added precautions.42
For example, mohelim that still use their mouths to apply oral suction to the wound
first rinse their mouths with an antiseptic.43 Others may use sponges or other
medical devices to cleanse the wound and alternatively stop the bleeding.44 The
latest method recently endorsed by the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA) is to
suction the blood from the circumcision using a glass tube to prevent direct oral to
genital contact.45
In a policy published by the RCA in March of 2005 and revised in June of the
same year, “the RCA urges its member Rabbis, their congregants, synagogues and
institutions, as well as the larger Jewish community, to encourage and where
possible necessitate, that metzitzah be’peh be fulfilled via a tube.”46 The policy
supports the use of a tube as being the optimal method.47 The published statement
further concluded that after diligent review of halachic and scientific literature, and
reliable Torah authorities, the use of a tube “is not only permissible, but is preferred
[over direct oral contact] to eliminate any unintentional communication of infectious
diseases.”48 In 2002, the Chief Rabbinate of Israel pronounced the legitimacy of
“using instrumental suction in cases in which there is a risk of contagious disease.”49
Irrespective of the specific method, it appears that extraction of blood from the
circumcision is a required element for a successful religious bris.50 Hence, there are
37

See id. at 571-72 for a complete detailed description of the circumcision ritual including
the specific technique, tools, and antiseptic precautions to be used for the ceremony. See also,
Gesundheit, supra note 17.
38

Gesundheit, supra note 17.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 1, at 572. It was believed that the saliva of the
human mouth was a sterile agent before modern science and advances in technology.
42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Rabbinical Council of America, supra note 3.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.
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four different viewpoints concerning the ritual of metzitzah be’peh.51 The first
approach considers the procedure to be a “medical matter.”52 The theory interprets
the Talmud as requiring the ritual procedure to avoid medical problems.53
Proponents of this theory acknowledge that the act may pose a potential danger to
the child but suggest that it also provides a medical benefit to the child.54 The second
approach is founded upon the simple belief that the ritual is required, but its method
can be performed using any device (sponge, tube, mouth, etc.).55 Similarly, the third
viewpoint also hinges on the fact that the ritual is required.56 However, the method
of oral suction is limited to either the mouth or a tube.57 And finally, the fourth
approach is that the ritual is not only required, but must be done using direct oralgenital suction.58
Yet, nowhere in the Talmud does the text expressly require mouth to penis oral
suction.59 It was once recognized as the method of choice when the saliva was
believed to be a disinfectant.60 Alternatively, the Talmud does expressly indicate
that metzitzah be’peh be performed only in such a way “so as not to bring on risk.”61
Like any other text, the words are open to interpretation. One suggested
interpretation of the Talmud’s language is to actually prohibit oral-genital suction in
light of the risks presented.62 However, a Jewish minority does not apply this
interpretation and continues to advocate for strict oral suction.63 As a result of the
combination of increased medical technology and heightened awareness of risks of
communicable diseases, most Jews have moved away from directly applying mouth
to penis oral suction.
III. THE HERPES SIMPLEX VIRUS: A SCIENTIFIC GLANCE AT THE POOR PROGNOSIS
The incurable Herpes Simplex Virus affects the genitalia and/or the mouth and
lips of men and women.64 Between the late 1970’s and the early 1990’s, HSV
51

Gesundheit, supra note 17.

52

Rabbinical Council of America, Regarding Metzitzah Be’Peh, RCA Clarifies Halachic
Background to Statement of March 1, 2005, (July 7, 2005), available at http://www.rabbis.org/
news/article.cfm?=100605
53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Rabbinical Council of America, supra note 52.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Gesundheit, supra note 17.

61

ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 1, at 572.

62

Gesundheit, supra note 17.

63

Id.

64
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 189 (2005), available at
http://www.merck.com/mmpe/sec14/ch189/ch189d.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
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incidence within the United States increased by thirty percent. Statistics indicate that
today at least one in five adults is infected with some form of HSV.65 The virus is
considered to be the most common ulcerative sexually transmitted disease (STD) in
developed countries.66 Although sexual transmission is the most common mode of
transmission, the virus can also be passed through oral contact or general physical
contact with a person who may have the virus on their hands, fingers, or skin.67
Oral HSV (HSV-I) is commonly identified as “cold sores.”68 The virus causes
small blisters, or sores, on the oral mucosa, lips, or skin surrounding the lips.69 It is
estimated that approximately ninety percent of adults have been exposed to HSV-I.70
This form of the virus is transmitted through such ordinary examples as oral
secretions including kissing, sharing utensils, and spitting.71 The recurrence rate of
those infected with oral herpes is fifty percent.72 The trigger for, and frequency of,
recurrences is unpredictable and unknown.73 However, once the virus has infected a
body, it remains dormant within the nerve cells between outbreaks and can still be
transmitted absent obvious signs and symptoms.74 Oral-genital contact with a person
who has oral herpetic blisters can lead to genital herpes (HSV-II).75
About twenty-five percent of the adult population has been exposed to genital
herpes.76 Genital HSV (HSV-II) is very cumbersome and typically manifests itself
as tiny clusters of painful sores that eventually develop into fluid filled blisters.77
The fluid inside the blisters is a clear or yellowish color packed with viruses.78 A
few painful days after the blisters form, they break and the virus filled fluid is
released.79 After the small ulcers shed the viruses, the blisters become “crusted”

65

Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
Genital Herpes: CDC Fact Sheet (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/std/Herpes/STD
Fact-Herpes.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
66

Id.

67

MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY, supra note 64, at 13.

68

Id.

69

National Institutes of Health, MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, Herpes Genital
(2005), available at http:// www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000857.htm (last
visited Dec. 15, 2006).
70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 69, at 14.

75

MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 189, supra note 64, at 13.

76

MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 69, at 14.

77

MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 189, supra note 64, at 13.

78

Id.

79

Id.
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healing over a period of one to two weeks.80 Other signs and symptoms associated
more commonly with the initial outbreak of a herpes infection include fever, malaise,
and adenopathy (swelling of the glands).81 During initial herpetic outbreaks, some
individuals report dysuria (difficulty urinating) and neuropathic symptoms of pain to
the hips or legs.82 The recurrence rate for HSV-II is 80%.83 The symptoms of
recurrences may be more or less severe than those associated with the initial
outbreak, but annoyances such as itching, tingling, or burning may signal the onset
of an outbreak.84
Little is known about how to predict HSV recurrences, but modern medicine has
yielded new medications to help relieve symptoms of recurrent outbreaks in adults.
To date, no known cure exists. The virus is extremely virulent and can be
transmitted from contact even with the use of a condom.85 STD awareness has
become part of the mainstream of our society, but the exposure risks remain high in
part because of the virulent nature of HSV. While most adults engaging in sexual
and oral contact with other adults are aware of the burdensome consequences of
“catching” herpes, innocent infants who contract the virus from a reckless or
negligent individual performing an outdated religious ritual are not making the
conscious choice to risk death or permanent injury, or experience a lifetime of
inconvenience and humiliation.
Because of HSV’s close link with the nervous system, the virus poses a
significant threat of complications in neonates.86 Some individuals infected with
HSV are asymptomatic, which means their bodies will harbor the virus, but they will
not notice or exhibit any physical symptoms.87 HSV hides in human nerve cells.88
The human immune system cannot effectively detect and destroy the virus because
of its discrete location within these nerve cells.89 The virus can reactivate at anytime
during a person’s lifetime.90

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 189, supra note 64, at 13.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Center for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 65, at 15.

86

MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 279 (2005), available at http://www.
merck.com/mmpe/sec19/ch279/ch279h.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
87
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 189, supra note 64, at 13. This point is
particularly important with regards to metzitzah be’peh. Assuming that mohels can be
asymptomatic, there is no way of knowing that they may transmit the virus to infants during
the ritual. One possible solution is to mandate all mohels obtain and continuously repeat HSV
testing. This solution would place an economic and physical burden on the many mohels that
do oral-suction, and therefore, should not be considered an acceptable alternative solution.
88

MEDLINE PLUS MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 69, at 14.

89

Id.

90

Id.
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Neonatal HSV is particularly dangerous because infants are immunodeficient
(underdeveloped weak immune systems).91 HSV can be transmitted to infants
through a mother’s vaginal fluid during delivery, from caregivers who fail to practice
good hygiene, and from oral-genital contact through the Jewish religious ritual,
metzitzah be’peh.92 Unlike adults, who do not risk death by contracting HSV-I or II,
there is a high mortality rate for infants with HSV.93 Recognizing the lethal potential
of HSV, medical practitioners generally exercise extreme caution when delivering
babies of HSV infected mothers. During an outbreak, the riskiest period when the
virus is shed through the fluid from the blisters, doctors perform Cesarean births to
avoid transmitting the virus to the neonate. Infants infected with HSV may
experience a wide range of symptoms. Temperature instability, lethargy, difficulty
breathing, shortness of breath, convulsions, hepatitis, and disseminated intravascular
coagulation are potential symptoms, all of which are themselves individually life
threatening to infants.94
Neonatal HSV has three classifications: (1) disseminated, (2) localized with the
central nervous system affected, and (3) localized without the central nervous system
being affected.95 Disseminated HSV poses the greatest threat to infants, as its
mortality rate is eighty-five percent if left untreated.96 Infants within this
classification typically have the herpes virus spread throughout their organs and the
central nervous systems are attacked, impaired, and potentially damaged.97 Herpetic
encephalitis (inflammation of the brain) is often the end result which causes death or
permanent brain damage to the infants.98
Infants with localized HSV affecting the central nervous system have a mortality
rate of fifty percent without treatment.99 Unlike those with disseminated HSV, the
organs are not affected.100 However, their skin may be affected and encephalitis is
again the threatening complication within this classification.101 Neonates who
experience the least amount of complications and symptoms are those within the
localized category without central nervous system involvement.102 Their symptoms
are localized as the classification implies and include outbreaks affecting only the
skin, eyes, and mouth.103 Although infants within this category are not likely to die,
91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 279, supra note 86, at 17.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY ch. 279, supra note 86, at 17.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id.
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thirty percent will suffer some form of neurological impairment that develops before
the ages of two or three.104
IV. METZITZAH BE’PEH GREATLY INCREASES THE RISK OF NEONATAL HSV
TRANSMISSION
Results of a medical study published in 2004 reveal the high risk of HSV
infection correlated between HSV and the oral-genital suction ritual.105 Objectives of
the study were: 1) to “describe neonate genital HSV-I infection after ritual
circumcision” and 2) to “investigate the association between genital HSV-I and the
practice of the traditional circumcision.”106 To date, there is minimal research that is
as specific and relevant to the issue at hand, and New York City’s health department
based a considerable amount of its investigative conclusions on this study along with
the results of two others.107
In concluding that oral suction is “hazardous to the neonate,” Gesundheit’s
research finds “ritual Jewish circumcision that includes direct oral-genital contact
carries a serious risk for transmission of HSV from mohels to neonates which can be
complicated by protracted or severe infection.”108 The study was based on eight
documented incidences of newborns with herpetic infections following metzitzah
be’peh.109 Information describing the HSV in the infants following ritual
circumcision shows that the infections averaged 7.25 days to manifest themselves.110
Of the subjects, four had episodes that were recurrent, meaning there were more
symptomatic periods after the initial outbreak.111 One of the infants developed HSV
encephalitis.112 And all of the mohels tested for HSV antibodies were found to be
seropositive.113 Because metzitzah be’peh is a private Orthodox ritual, the
researchers were unable to statistically evaluate the percentage of ritual
circumcisions that use alternative instrumental suction over direct oral suction.114
Circumcision rituals generally take place when an infant is eight days old
generating the necessity to rule out the possibility that the virus was transmitted from
the mother’s genital secretions during a vaginal delivery.115 The study reports the
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general incidence rate of HSV ranges from one to six per 20,000 live births.116 Of
those reported infections, most result from the transmission between mother and
infant during natural vaginal delivery.117 In rare cases, an infant may contract the
virus postnatal from exposure to child care providers, caregivers, or parents during
oral herpes outbreaks.118 In Gesundheit’s study, none of the mothers presented any
clinical evidence of either oral or genital herpes, thus limiting the source of the
herpetic infections to postnatal exposure.119
The conclusion that these eight subjects most likely contracted HSV from oralgenital suction during ritual circumcision is based on the following distinct elements:
1) “exclusive genital distribution” of the herpetic sores, 2) the timing of the
outbreak’s onset, 3) isolation of HSV-I (oral herpes virus) as opposed to HSV-II
(genital herpes virus), 4) the negative HSV exposure of the subjects’ mothers, and 5)
the absence of signs and symptoms associated with herpes among any family
members or caregivers.120 From these findings, researchers correlated a direct nexus
between the ritual circumcision of the subjects and their oral herpetic infections on
their genitalia (which for some subjects became systemic).121 The study further
reported that since the virus is at times shed in the saliva of both symptomatic and
asymptomatic individuals, oral-genital suction during ritual circumcision “represents
a potential source of orogenital transmission to the nonimmune infant whose skin
integrity was disrupted by circumcision.”122
In addition to the medical findings, Gesundheit acknowledges that the ritual
circumcision “is a sign of eternal covenant between God and the Jewish people.”123
However, the study also notes the Talmud lacks an express requirement of the use of
oral suction for metzitzah be’peh.124 Conversely, a popular interpretation of the
Talmud implies that metzitzah be’peh should be performed “so as not to bring on
risk.”125 The medical findings of this study conclusively indicate a significant
correlation between the risk of HSV transmission to infants and oral suction, and
accordingly, the study strongly discourages oral suction.126
A similar medical study published in 2000 also explored a potential connection
between HSV and oral suction after investigating only two subjects.127 The findings
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and conclusions mirror those of Gesundheit’s 2004 study except that the number of
subjects in the earlier study was only two instead of eight.128 A review of the
medical literature reveals that this was the first medical study relating to HSV and
Jewish ritual circumcision practices. However, medical practitioners as early as
1946 identified the risk of transmitting infectious agents through general oral contact
with the penis.129 The research in 1946 reported an alarming seventy-two cases
involving tuberculosis on the penis following ritual circumcision including metzitzah
be’peh.130 Oral-genital suction greatly increase neonates’ risk of not only contracting
HSV, but also contracting many other infectious agents like Hepatitis C, Hepatitis B,
and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).131
V. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: THE JUDICIAL FORK IN THE ROAD
HSV is an incurable plague especially dangerous and posing a high risk of
mortality to neonates. Studies clearly indicate that the virus can be easily transmitted
during the Jewish oral-genital ritual, even where a trained mohel does not exhibit any
signs or symptoms of the common oral herpetic infection. And while metzitzah
be’peh is a highly valued and protected ritual amongst a minority of Orthodox Jews,
the use of direct mouth to penis contact is not mandated by any Jewish law authority.
The question now becomes whether the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause protects
the ancient tradition that has been widely abandoned in light of the compelling
medical evidence.
Attached to the Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”132 Like most of the words and provisions of
the United States Constitution, the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment is
subject to the Court’s interpretation.133 Is the freedom of religion absolute?134 Can a
priest molest a child and hide behind the cloak of religion? Can a preacher slaughter
available at http://www.pidj.org/pt/re/pidj/abstract.00006454-200003000-0025.htm
visited Dec. 15, 2006).
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by prohibiting any governmental interference thereof. See generally Sch. Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Individuals have an absolute right to freely believe. However, the freedom to act upon those
beliefs has not been given total immunity from legislative restrictions. [See Brandon v. Bd. of
Educ. of Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (N.D. NY, 1980)], cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
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an innocent animal as an offering to a higher spiritual power?135 Does a person’s
religious use of Peyote immunize him or her from penalty for using illegal
substances?136 Does the Free Exercise clause protect a mohel with HSV who
transmitted the virus to an infant during a widely abandoned ritual effectuating a
covenant with God? This list of questions covers a broad range of facts and
circumstances and is by no means exhaustive of the issues that have faced the
Supreme Court or will one day be before the Bench. But the Court has offered some
relative guidance in addressing the answers to some of these questions.
In Oregon Employ Div. v. Smith, the Supreme Court’s opinion succinctly
summarizes the interpretive case law behind the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause.137 Free exercise is defined as the “right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires” without interference from governmental regulation.138
A particular faith cannot be endorsed by the government or forced upon anyone,139
and the government cannot punish people for practicing beliefs that it believes to be
false,140 award accommodations on the basis of preferred religious beliefs,141 or take
sides and provide assistance in a dispute based on religious differences.142 These are
the interpretations that have been adopted through established case law.
Additionally, encapsulated within the language of the First Amendment is the
Free Speech Clause.143 Precedent has determined that the constitutionally protected
right of free speech is not absolute.144 The Supreme Court decisions in Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner and Lebron v. NRPC limit the amendment’s reach to state action.145 The
135
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136

Oregon Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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implication of such findings is that private rules regulating free speech are outside
the purview of Constitutional protection.146
Although ritual circumcision and the associated component of metzitzah be’peh
date back to ancient times, neither the framers of the Constitution nor the collective
citizens of the United States who ratified the First Amendment could have
anticipated the legal issue focused upon here. Presumably, the early American
settlers and colonies were primarily composed of western Europeans not of the
Jewish faith who were fleeing from religious persecution. It is not surprising then
that Jewish rituals and practices were not at the forefront of the developing way of
American life. As such, the earliest citizens of the United States and their
representatives could not have reasonably anticipated metzitzah be’peh becoming a
legal concern.
During the first half of the twentieth century when more Jewish individuals
immigrated to America, attention within the medical community was drawn to the
ritual practice of oral suction in 1946 when E.L. Lewis published a study that
correlated metzitzah be’peh with the transmission of infectious diseases.147 In the
1940s, incidences of primary tuberculosis of the penis increased. And, seventy-two
of eighty-nine reported incidences of infection followed the Jewish ritual
circumcision procedure which included the practice of oral suction.148 The study also
noted that diphtheria and syphilis in infants were two other highly contagious
infectious agents that afflicted neonates following the ritual.149 Based on a review of
the literature, Lewis revealed that by the turn of the 20th century, the Jewish majority
had stopped the practice of metzitzah be’peh altogether.150 Customs and rituals are
sometimes subject to change over time like anything else, but there is still a small
minority of Orthodox Jewish families that adhere to the belief that direct oral suction

146
The validity of private tort claims is not an issue of discussion within this note but the
following is worth noting for future reference. When addressing the issue of whether or not
courts should recognize private tort claims when the tort in question is related to a religious
ritual, courts are likely to impose limitations similar to those regarding Free Speech on the
First Amendment’s scope. The free exercise of religion should not be absolute where the
religious act results in a private wrong. Constitutional precedent limits interference with First
Amendment rights, but between two private parties where one is seeking redress for injuries,
Free Exercise protection should not be invoked and the courts should be permitted to address
private torts claims. By denying a private tort claim to proceed on the grounds that the Free
Exercise Clause bars the judiciary from interfering because it would then be a state actor, the
provision places greater importance on religious freedom over the just compensation for
injurious actions between two private parties. The end result of denying religious based tort
claims can potentially lead to intentional and negligent tortious conduct without an avenue for
just compensation.
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is a necessity to accomplish the eternal covenant between the human being and
God.151
It is estimated that only about 4000 ritual circumcisions are performed each year
in the city of New York with direct mouth to penis metzitzah be’peh.152 Even in
Israel, the heart of the Judaic people, the Chief Rabbinate promotes the use of an
intermediate device to suction the blood from the wound.153 Despite the near
voluntary abandonment of oral suction amongst most Jewish families, these 4000
rituals performed each year still pose a significant risk of harm as evidenced by
scientific literature and documented medical evidence. For this reason, the Courts
may be called upon in the future to address state interference with the religious ritual,
in the form of either regulation or prohibition, and also to address the viability of
private tort claims of parents seeking remedies for the negligent injury or death of
their infants following metzitzah be’peh.
A. Metzitzah be’peh: Following the Supreme Court’s Path from Hialeah
Any proposed governmental regulation or state interference with the Jewish ritual
metzitzah be’peh places the Court at an important juncture in the road. The Supreme
Court in Oregon Employment and Hialeah, two distinctly different cases, paved the
precedent for interpretation of state action154 as applied to First Amendment
complaints. If faced with a question regarding government interference with
metzitzah be’peh, the Court must determine whether the issue should be analyzed
under the rational basis approach of Oregon Employment subject to the restraints of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, or whether this issue meets the
compelling interest, strict scrutiny test as applied in Hialeah.
In 2005, New York City governmental officials took action against the mohel
accused of transmitting herpes to three infants after metzitzah be’peh.155 The city’s
health commissioner filed a civil suit in a New York state court, and the mohel was
temporarily enjoined from performing oral suction pending the outcome of an
investigation by health officials.156 The Court also ordered the mohel to submit to
151
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of oral-genital bris rituals take place in New York.
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disease.” Note, however, that the statement seems to indicate that where there is no indication
of risk, oral suction would be appropriate using the mouth. Given the medical evidence
suggesting that direct oral suction itself presents a risk, the statement could be interpreted to
apply to all rituals. The exact intent of the Rabbinate is unknown.
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medical testing to determine his HSV status.157 The mohel’s legal counsel, the
immediate Jewish community, and First Amendment advocates sounded the alarm
that the state interfered with Constitutionally protected free exercise rights. The
Rabbinical Council of America declined to advocate a ban on direct oral-genital
suction but did release a policy statement encouraging mohelim to use an instrument,
such as a glass tube, in lieu of direct oral contact so as to eliminate the potential
health risk to infants.158 Currently, New York does not have a statue that specifically
criminalizes either the ritual of oral suction or the transmission of herpes.
Although New York’s health department dismissed its action in September of
2005 and turned over the investigation and regulation of the questionable religious
ritual to the Jewish community,159 the issue is still at the center of debate. New York
health officials have taken a stance against oral suction by issuing a policy statement
and implementing programs to increase the Jewish community’s awareness of the
risks involved with metzitzah be’peh.160 Given the limited but credible medical
evidence that metzitzah be’peh poses a significant health risk to infants,161 coupled
with the reported fact that approximately 4,000 rituals with oral suction are still
performed yearly,162 future incidences of infants contracting HSV following
metzitzah be’peh are highly probable.
New York City is now faced with the challenge of enacting legislation to protect
the health and safety of infant citizens. The fierce opposition to legislative or
judicial interference is hiding behind the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. New York City’s Health Commissioner, Dr. Thomas Frieden, believes
“a ban would be unenforceable.”163 However, in light of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Hialeah, the city can and should take necessary action to protect
the compelling interest of its citizens. Supporters of the outdated and dangerous
ritual should not successfully continue to hide behind the First Amendment.
In contrast to Hialeah, the Oregon Employment court decided that Oregon’s
action was neutral on its face and generally applicable to everyone within Oregon’s
borders.164 Accordingly, it was not necessary for the Oregon Employment Division
to prove a compelling governmental interest. The Court does not require a strict
scrutiny balancing between compelling state interest and private interests in
exercising religion where the action is otherwise Constitutional. Using a rational
basis analysis, the Court held that although Smith and Black’s religious exercise was
157
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incidentally infringed upon by Oregon’s controlled substances and unemployment
benefits laws, there was no religious exception, and constitutionally there need be no
exception, for the sacramental use of peyote.165 Even though the two Native
Americans had ingested the peyote for religious purposes, they were still legally
barred by Oregon law from receiving unemployment benefits.
Unlike the existence of the challenged statute in Oregon Employment, there is
currently no existing criminal statute in New York that specifically bars the practice
of oral suction. Under the state constitution of New York, however,
“[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state
to all humankind and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a
witness on account of his or her opinions on matters of religious belief;
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to
exclude acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this state.”166
It would be consistent with New York’s constitution for the state to enact legislation
that furthers the principles set forth in that constitution to prevent the construction of
the free exercise of religion to encompass a licentious act or a practice inconsistent
with the peace or safety of the state.
Whether metzitzah be’peh is morally wrong or not is a question best left
untouched because it involves a highly religious question that no court or legislative
body has the power to answer.167 However, since oral suction is a “practice” which
is “inconsistent with the safety of the state,” it can be, and should be, appropriately
excluded from the protection of the freedom of worship section of the New York
Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Because there is ample evidence linking the significant
risks of HSV transmission with oral-genital suction, the state has a compelling
interest to protect its citizens. The health risk is a safety concern which falls under
the general police powers of all states.
The State of New York does not have a generally applicable criminal statute
under which it could likely bring a successful criminal claim against a mohel for
infecting an infant with the lifelong, incurable herpes disease. In Oregon
Employment, the First Amendment challenge was raised in response to an existing
generally applicable and neutral law that prohibits the use of illegal drugs.168 One of
the associated penalties of drug use is the loss of unemployment benefits following
termination from employment based on the misconduct.169
165
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New York is not likely to present a case in the future which could follow the
precedent of Oregon Employment because metzitzah be’peh cannot cleanly fall under
any existing criminal or civil law. The sexual offenses of the New York Penal Code
are inapplicable to oral suction because infants’ parents, the legal guardians,
typically give consent on behalf of the infant.170 Furthermore, contrary to the
challenged law in Oregon Employment, any action by the government would be
discriminatory and clearly intended to target the religious practice of metzitzah
be’peh. As the Court in Hialeah indicated, the Court has yet to address the rare
instance whereby “a law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or
advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious
motivation will survive strict scrutiny.”171
In Hialeah, the citizens were appalled and distressed by the heinous act of animal
sacrifice.172 Animal sacrifice, however, is an essential cornerstone of the Santeria
Church because followers believe that it keeps the mortal spirits alive.173 Without
the spirits, the Santeria faith is void. Therefore, the believers must continue to
supply spirits’ lifelines by offering the sacramental animal sacrifices.174 The District
Court upheld the constitutional validity of the municipal ordinances citing the
government’s compelling interests.175 But the only health interest of concern was the
fact that the sacrificed animals were not subject to inspection and were uncleanly
kept.176 The Supreme Court of the United States did not find this to be a compelling
interest of the highest order.177
But following the precedent set in Hialeah, New York can enact regulatory
measures or prohibitions on oral-genital suction that intentionally interfere with the
free exercise of religion and “targets [metzitzah be’peh] for distinctive treatment.”
Any state action would ultimately be subject to strict scrutiny under Hialeah, but a
governmental body could survive such scrutiny by proving that the compelling
interest of protecting the citizens (the infants exposed to HSV and other infectious
agents via religious oral suction) far outweighs the religious protection afforded by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. As the Hialeah court
determined, the state interest must override the free exercise interest in order to meet
strict scrutiny. In other words, a law that is intended to restrict free religious practice

170
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must advance “interests of the highest order.”178 The preservation of Jewish infants’
health and their potential ability to spread HSV infections within the population in
the future are arguably interests of the highest order. The Hialeah Court alluded that
governmental intervention may be appropriate in rare instances where the Court’s
strict scrutiny standard is satisfied. Metzitzah be’peh is one such rare instance
presenting a compelling governmental interest because scientific evidence links the
oral suction ritual to the death and infection of infants.
The city of Hialeah failed to prove that a compelling governmental interest
outweighed their legislation restricting the Santeria Church from performing their
animal sacrifices.179 Another distinguishing point between Hialeah and a potential
action regulating or banning metzitzah be’peh lies within the nature of the religious
rituals. The safety interests of protecting animals, or the mere fact that the animals
are not inspected and may pose a health risk to those exposed, are not compelling
when compared to the interest in protecting infants from becoming infected with
HSV, compelling interest of the highest order.
HSV is a lifelong disease with no known cure. The emotional and psychological
effects are also lifelong in addition to the high probability of recurrent outbreaks and
the discomfort they create.180 Infants with HSV may grow to be fully functioning
adults, but evidence suggests that the early HSV exposure often lends itself to
developmental disabilities which manifest between two and three years of age.181
The child, therefore, may be developmentally impacted. Regardless of the severity
of the impact, the HSV infected infant grows to be either an asymptomatic or
symptomatic adult who will always poses a risk to sexual partners. These long term,
permanent effects of neonatal HSV infection could easily be avoided by eliminating
direct oral-genital contact during metzitzah be’peh and encouraging the alternative
instrumental method endorsed by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel in 2002 and the
Rabbinical Council of America in 2005. The state also has a compelling interest in
limiting the perpetual spread of HSV amongst its population.
Hileah strongly concludes in stating, “[t]he Free Exercise Clause commits
government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that
proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religious or distrust of its
practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the
Constitution and to the rights it secures.”182 In Hialeah, the city merely disapproved
of animal sacrifice as a moral activity.183 While metzitzah be’peh may seem immoral
to those outside the Jewish religious faith, it is a ritual deeply rooted in ancient
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Jewish history.184 Many Jewish followers believe that a child without metzitzah
be’peh is a child without a covenant with God.185
Allowing the continuation of the dangerous ritual, even if it’s only performed on
approximately 4000 infants per year, is contrary to any government’s role in
protecting its citizens from health and safety risks. In light of the death of one New
York infant, and the permanent effects and lifelong infection of the two other infants,
New York City would be neglecting its high duty to its citizens by not protecting
their health and safety. The state cannot eliminate the practice altogether, nor has
there been any indication of an attempt to do so, but the government can
constitutionally express a preference for the use of instrumental suction over oralsuction. The government can even go so far as to prohibit, or regulate, oral-suction
because it is within their police power to do so, and because there is a compelling
health interest that far outweighs any religious interest.
B. Oregon Employment: Paving the Way for Laws Affecting Religion
The United States Supreme Court adopted the rational basis method of analysis
for most First Amendment interpretations of state action in Oregon Employment.186
When state action controversially infringes upon free exercise rights, the Court first
looks at the language and intent behind the statute to determine the neutrality of the
action.187 If the statute appears to be neutral and the sole purpose of prohibiting a
performance, as an example of a state action, is not “because of [its] religious
motivation,” then the Court next turns to the general application of the regulation.188
A law that is not “specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise
constitutional” is determined to be generally applicable even if there is an “incidental
effect” on a religious belief or practice.189 In the Oregon Employment case, the Court
held that it need not apply a balancing test where a generally applicable law does not
have to be supported by a compelling governmental interest.190
184
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religion. Under this federal statute meant to restore the religious freedom limited by the
Supreme Court in Oregon Employment, burdens imposed by generally applicable laws cannot
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In Oregon, when Alfred Smith and Galen Black were denied unemployment
benefits because they were terminated from their jobs following work-related
misconduct, they brought an action against the state’s alleged denial of their free
religious exercise.191 Smith and Black were both members of the Native American
Church. One of the religious rituals involves the sacramental use of peyote.192
Because of Smith and Black’s use of the controlled substance, their employment was
terminated and they were ineligible to receive unemployment benefits as a result of
their “misconduct.”193
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the Oregon Employment Division’s
determination that their use of peyote constituted misconduct and barred them from
receiving unemployment benefits following their termination.194 The appellate court
reasoned that Smith and Black’s right to free exercise under the First Amendment
was unduly intruded upon by the state’s action.195 Oregon’s supreme court
“concluded that [the former employees] were entitled to payment of unemployment
benefits.”196 Holding that the state court incorrectly balanced the burden on free
exercise with the preservation of “financial integrity of the compensation fund” in
reaching its conclusion, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case back to
Oregon’s supreme court.197 As the United States Supreme Court did not have the
authority to intrude upon Oregon’s police power, the Oregon Supreme Court was
charged with the task of determining whether the use of peyote for religious practice
is protected under state law.198 The Oregon Supreme Court again reached the same
conclusion after deciding that Oregon’s criminal statute as applied to the use of
controlled substances “makes no exception for the sacramental use” of peyote.199
The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari.
Smith and Black failed in their attempt to convince the United States Supreme
Court “that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach
of criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is
be imposed unless there is a compelling governmental interest to justify substantial burdens.
In effect, the RFRA contradicted the Oregon Employment precedent by imposing a statutory
higher standard of review. See also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006), where a generally applicable drug law affected a genuine
religious practice of consuming an herbal hallucinogenic tea, but the Court held the
government failed to prove a compelling interest to justify the substantial burden on the
church under the RFRA.
191

Oregon Employment, 494 U.S. at 884.

192

Id. Peyote is a hallucinogen from the Lophophora williamsii Lemaire plant and is
classified as a Schedule I controlled substance. Abuse or use of the controlled substance is a
felony offense in the State of Oregon. See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 475.840 (2006).
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Id. (quoting Oregon Employment Div. v. Smith, 763 P.2d 146 (1988)).
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concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons.”200
The argument sought to construct the First Amendment as encompassing neutral
laws that are generally applicable to all individuals when those laws incidentally
result in a burden to a religious practice. The Court did not favor this argument and
refused to increase the scope of the First Amendment. The idea that an individual
can “break” a law that is applicable to everyone merely because his religious practice
commands an activity that has been legislated as illegal is not well received by the
Court. The Court concluded that “to permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself.”201
In the end, Smith and Black were constitutionally denied unemployment benefits
for using peyote, even when that use was for a sacramental purpose. The Court held
that they need not apply a balancing test where a law that is generally applicable is
unsupported by a compelling governmental interest.202 While the state action clearly
infringes upon the free exercise of their right to use peyote for their ritual, the
substance abuse laws are not intended to directly target religious practices.
Accordingly, everyone is susceptible to the same rules and penalties as Smith and
Black. Interference with their religious practice is only an incidental excess of the
general drug laws that apply equally to everyone in the State of Oregon. The Court
refused to grant Smith and Black an exception to the state’s constitutional law simply
on the grounds that their constitutional free exercise right was indirectly infringed
upon. This decision arguably undermines the potency of the First Amendment
protection of free religion.203
C. Hialeah: The Supreme Court Takes a Different Direction
Three years after the Court’s decision in Oregon Employment, and in the same
year that Congress passed Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Court granted a
religious organization’s petition for certiorari in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah.204 In Hialeah, The petitioners claimed a violation of their
First Amendment right to freely exercise their religious beliefs and rituals.205 In
deciding that case, the Court departed from the rational basis analysis test used in
Oregon Employment and alternatively relied upon a strict scrutiny analysis because

200

Oregon Employment, 494 U.S. at 878.

201

Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 167 (1879)).

202

Oregon Employment, 494 U.S. at 887-89. The Court carefully distinguishes between
application of minimum scrutiny in certain First Amendment claims versus strict scrutiny in
other First Amendment claims. Justice O’Conner cautioned that strict scrutiny should be
applied all cases where the fundamental free exercise right is interfered with by any State
action, but the majority did not agree with this conception where the Oregon state only
incidentally interfered with Smith and Blacks’ freedom to practice their religion.
203

Congress enacted the RFRA of 1993 in the wake of the Oregon Employment decision to
remedy for this diminished potency.
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See Church of the Lukumi babalu Aye, Inc., v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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Id.
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of the discriminatory nature of the state’s action and its limited applicability to the
Santeria believers.206
In Hialeah, members of the Santeria religion sought to protect their right to
sacrifice animals, such as chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep,
and turtles for the purpose of keeping the mortal spirits, (based on Catholic saints)
alive.207 Originating in Cuba amidst the Yoruba people, descendents of the West
Africans condemned to slavery in Cuba during the period of the slave trade, Santeria
is a combination of traditional West African religion and Roman Catholicism.208 As
civil unrest ripped through the island of Cuba, several of the Yoruba people came to
the United States, specifically southern Florida, to escape continued cultural and
religious persecution.209 Within the borders of the United States, most of the people
practicing Santeria continue to do so discretely, perpetuating the habit of hiding their
religious beliefs in Cuba.210
In 1973, one Santeria church became organized as a non-profit organization
under Florida state law.211 Then in 1987, the Santeria Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye through its highest priest and incorporation’s president, leased a parcel of land
in the city of Hialeah.212 In addition to constructing a church, they openly expressed
their intent to build a school, cultural center, and museum in an effort to “bring the
practice of the Santeria faith, including its ritual of animal sacrifice, into the open.”213
In August of 1987, the Church successfully obtained the necessary licenses and
permits required to proceed with their plans.214
While the Santeria Church was attempting to obtain permits and licenses, the city
council met during an emergency meeting and passed a number of municipal
resolutions directed at the Santeria Church.215 Prompted by the “distress” of Hialeah
residents, the proposed ordinances were enacted in September of 1987 to quench the
general population’s concerns that the practices of Santeria not only failed to
conform to “public morals, peace or safety” but the animal sacrifices might also be
brought out into the open public.216 In particular, the city passed an animal cruelty
ordinance fully incorporating Florida state law but additionally subjecting anyone
who “unnecessarily or cruelly . . . kills any animal” to criminal punishment.217 The
206

See generally id. The majority of the opinion discusses why the Court applied a strict
scrutiny test.
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penalties for violating any of Hialeah’s four newly adopted ordinances included fines
of up to $500 and/or a jail sentence of up to 60 days.218 In response to these
ordinances, the Santeria Church filed a cause of action alleging a violation of their
First Amendment right to freely practice their religion.219
For the majority of Americans who do not practice Santeria, it is difficult to
comprehend the religious necessity of animal sacrifice to keep the mortal spirits
alive. In fact, for most people the concept of slitting the throat of an innocent sheep,
pigeon, turtle, goat, or any other harmless animal, is foreign, immoral, and perhaps
downright disgusting. For the citizens of Hialeah, Florida, Santeria ritual animal
sacrifice was not only distressful, but immoral, not peaceful, and unsafe.220 But the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that regardless of the barbaric nature of
certain religious beliefs and practices, the Free Exercise Clause constitutionally
guarantees the freedom of religion of even those religious beliefs, like Santeria, that
are not “acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.”221 The First
Amendment does not expressly restrict the application of the Free Exercises
clause.222 The Supreme Court in Hialeah reversed the District Court and Court of
Appeals findings by including the Free Exercise clause’s protection to Santeria’s
animal sacrifice rituals.223
The District Court in Hialeah applied a strict scrutiny analysis.224 In upholding
the validity of Hialeah’s ordinances, which were determined to be neutral “on their
face,” the court decisively recognized the city’s compelling interest to justify the
incidental interference with the free exercise of Santeria’s religious ritual sacrifice.225
“Four compelling interests” were identified that tipped the scales of justice in the
city’s favor.226 First, “animal sacrifices present a substantial health risk” because
they are “kept in unsanitary conditions” that are not inspected, and their parts are
“found in public places.”227 Second, there is a risk of “emotional injury to children
who witness” the ritual.228 Third, the city has a compelling interest to protect
animals from cruelty.229 And finally, the city did have a compelling “interest in
restricting the slaughter” of animals to “areas zoned to allow for slaughterhouse”
purposes.230
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Oregon Employment set one precedent for free exercise claim analyses.231
Generally, even though a law may incidentally burden a particular religious practice,
if the law is 1) neutral on its face and 2) generally applicable, the challenge need not
be analyzed by strict scrutiny because there is no need for a “compelling
governmental interest.”232 The animal cruelty ordinances passed as emergency
measures while the Santeria Church sought licenses and permits to begin
construction on their church in the city were far from neutral.233 Their sole purpose
and “object” was to suppress the Santeria religion within the city’s borders.234 The
Court references existing animosity at the time of their enactment and the direct
targeting of the Santeria religion.235 In addition to not being neutral, the ordinances
do not appear to be generally applicable, but instead apply only to those individuals
who practice Santeria.236 The District Court correctly applied strict scrutiny in
Hialeah because the law failed neutrality and general applicability.
“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”237 The Court in Wisconsin
v. Yoder established a free exercise clause balancing test based on strict scrutiny.238
The state interest must override the free exercise interest to meet strict scrutiny.239 In
other words, a law that is intended to restrict free religious practice “must advance
interests of the highest order.”240 The Hileah court stated in its opinion that “a law
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate
governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive
strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”241 The city of Hialeah failed to demonstrate that its
interests were compelling and outweighed the free exercise of Santeria’s animal
sacrifices.242 The Court accordingly acknowledged the potential for state action
which intentionally infringes upon the freedom of religion, but only in rare instances
where the governmental interests are adequately proven to be of the “highest
order.”243
The opinion in Hileah strongly concludes with a powerful statement. “The Free
Exercise clause commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even
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slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion
or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty
to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.”244 The Court left enough room for
intervention but only if such intervention meets strict scrutiny. Metzitzah be’peh
directly threatens the health and safety of infants. It is the government’s duty to
interfere where tolerance must give way for the health and safety of citizens.
VI. THE MODERN TREND: GOVERNMENT REGULATION AFFECTING RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS
While the First Amendment guarantees individuals the absolute freedom of
religious belief, religious conduct based on such beliefs is undeniably recognized as
being less than absolute where a government has a compelling interest to protect the
health and welfare of citizens.245 Weighing religious rights in the balance during the
1970’s, the scales temporarily tipped in favor of religious rights advocates and
accordingly a number of state religious exemption laws were enacted to protect
religious freedom.246 The scales, however, are adjusting to weigh the health and
welfare interests of children and the government’s duty to protect those interests.
The trend of repealing exemption laws reflects the general consensus of the
United States Supreme Court as opined in Oregon Employment and Hialeah. The
government has a duty to protect the health and well-being of individuals when those
needs are compelling and outweigh religious freedom. The duty is more than just an
interest, even if it is a compelling interest. In 1996, the federal government enacted a
statutory ban on female genital circumcision (also known as female genital
mutilation) to protect the heavily impacted health interests of women being mutilated
on cultural or religious grounds. And more and more states are repealing religious
shield laws recognizing the overriding duty owed to children when their parents
refuse them treatment for serious medical emergencies and illnesses.
A. Gradual Abandonment of Religious Shield Laws Protecting Parents from
Criminal Liability
Every year throughout the world, children die of treatable illnesses, diseases, and
injuries because parents or guardians refuse to seek medical treatment in furtherance
of their own religious beliefs.247 Several religions, most notably Christian Science
and Jehovah’s Witnesses, discourage the use of chemicals and modern medicine.248
In lieu of medical treatment, some parents faithfully adhere to strict, and arguably
244
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See generally Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids, and the Law: Inequities in
the American Healthcare System. 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 269 (2003).
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Id. at 298. Merrick’s article broadly approaches religious exemption laws and proposes
that exemptions should be modified to give citizens clear notice that the exemptions cease to
be applicable when the risk of harm to the child is serious, and/or the child is at risk of
irreparable harm or death.
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Davida A. Williams, Punishing the Faithful: Freud, Religion, and the Law, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 2181, 2185-86 (2003). See also Merrick, supra note 246, at 271-72. For a
history and general overview of Christian Science.
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extreme, religious beliefs and rely upon the power of prayer to heal their illnesses,
diseases, ailments, and injuries.249 People with a preference for spiritual healing
contest any state action requiring a person to seek medical treatment on the grounds
that such action interferes with the First Amendment free exercise guaranty.250 At
the other end of the debate, children’s rights advocates place the interests and rights
of children above the religious interests of their parents.251 Their arguments in
support of all necessary governmental actions are based on the government’s duty to
protect the health and welfare of children, regardless of the parents’ religious
preferences.252
Religious shield laws first came to fruition in 1974 when the federal government
offered funding for state child protection programs.253 Eligibility for the funding was
based on a state’s participation in the program by effectively shielding parents from
prosecution under child abuse and neglect statutes if they refused to seek medical
“treatment for their child based on religious” convictions.254 This mechanism serves
as a religious defense. While parents are shielded from these abuse and neglect laws
in more than forty states, most of those states have denied the inclusion of any such
exemption in manslaughter or child endangering cases, and parents have been
successfully prosecuted in those instances.255
Since the federal program began in 1974, high powered religious groups have
successfully lobbied their legislatures to incorporate immunities from criminal
liability when religious beliefs are intertwined.256 Depending on the jurisdiction,
parents who fail to obtain medical care for their sick and ailing children may be
shielded from prosecution under child abuse and child endangering statutes.257 But
249

See Williams, supra note 248, at 2186.

250

Cassandra Terhune, Cultural and Religious Defenses to Child Abuse and Neglect, 14 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 152, 170-73 (1997). Faith healing “is the practice of using one’s
religious beliefs to cure physiological, as well as psychological, sickness through prayer.”
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For two examples of such convictions, see Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1986),
affirming convictions of parents for reckless homicide after son died of pneumonia. The
parents refused to seek medical treatment for his condition based on their faith in religious
healing and prayer; See also Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(affirming convictions of parents for involuntary manslaughter after two year old son died
from cancerous tumor. The parents did not seek medical treatment for their son because of
their religious beliefs in spiritual healing).
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American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics. Religious Objections to
Medical Care. 99 PEDIATRICS 279 (1997), available at www.cirp.org/library/ethics/AAP3 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2006). “Through legislative activity at the federal and state levels, some
religious groups have sought, and in many cases attained, government recognition in the form
of… exemption from child abuse and neglect laws when children do not receive needed
medical care.”
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Although there have been some convictions under murder statutes as noted supra note
255, several child abuse and neglect laws contain exemptions to shield parents acting based on
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the liberal encouragement of religious exemption clauses within state criminal abuse
and neglect statutes was short lived.258 Not even ten years later in 1983, the federal
Department of Health and Human Services required states to report any and all cases
of child neglect, and also “required states to amend their definitions of neglect to
include failure to provide medical care.”259 The federal government’s shifted support
for religious exemption clauses was accompanied by a coercive tactic to withhold
child-abuse program grants from states not complying with the new federal
initiative.260
There remains a slow-moving push against the high-powered, financially backed
religious lobbyists to eliminate these shield laws altogether.261 The American
Academy of Pediatrics’ Committee on Bioethics, the National Committee for the
Prevention of Child Abuse, the National District Attorney’s Association, the
American Medical Association, parents, and other supporters of child’s rights have
all joined the movement to repeal existing state religious exemption statutes.262 If the
laws are blocked from repeal by strong lobbyists, the exemption laws may be
subjected to constitutional challenges “on the grounds that they deprive . . . children
of equal protection [and] due process.”263
In 1974, the federal government created a maelstrom by allowing and
encouraging religious exemption statutes. Instead of the ever feared “chilling effect”
that occasionally results from the enactment of certain laws, these shield laws had
the opposite impact on children’s rights. Where parents may have felt legally
obligated to seek treatment despite their strong religious convictions, they were now
encouraged to test their faith in spiritual healing and legally protected when acting on
those beliefs when it came to the health of their children. Fortunately, the shield
laws did not reach manslaughter statutes. In an era where Congress sought to afford
greater religious freedom to citizens, the religious shield laws took that liberty too
far. Congress temporarily displaced some of the government’s authority to act upon
compelling health interests of children in lieu of greater religious freedom. But as
more states repeal their exemption clauses and hold parents criminally liable under
religious beliefs from prosecution when a child suffers substantial harm; see Williams, supra
note 248, at 2186-87. “As of 2002, over fourty states and the District of Columbia have
included such exemptions in their child abuse and neglect laws.”
258
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neglect and child abuse statutes, the proper balance between religious freedom and
appropriate government regulation where interests are compelling is gradually being
restored.264
B. Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Circumcision: A Model for New York
One example of an existing statutory federal regulation of a procedure that is
arguably associated with religion is the statue prohibiting female genital mutilation
(FGM). In 1996, Congress passed legislation prohibiting FGM.265 FGM is an act
which involves the circumcision of the whole or any part of the labia or clitoris of
another person who is not eighteen years old.266 Unique to this statute is section (c)
which reads, “No account shall be taken of the effect on the person on whom the
operation is to be performed of any belief on the part of that person, or any other
person, that the operation is required as a matter of custom or ritual.”267 To this date,
there have been no recorded challenges to the federal statute.268
The first reported Congressional finding is that “the practice of female genital
mutilation is carried out by members of certain cultural and religious groups.”269
Although Congress acknowledged that some groups carry out the procedure under
the pretext of being mandated by a religion or religious purpose, nothing indicates
that Congress targeted the procedure as a religious practice. The debate is
continuing over the purposes and rationales of FGM.
As travel has become more accessible to people of all different races, religions,
and cultures throughout the world, their customs, rituals, and beliefs have also been
transported, disseminated, and practiced throughout the world. The ritual of FGM is
most commonly practiced in many countries in Africa and the Middle East.270 As
FGM is performed by many different religious and cultural groups, “the underlying
rationales for its practice . . . vary greatly.”271 Women from many different religions,
264
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including Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Copts, Animists, and atheists, have been
subjected to FGM.272
Contrary to some of the prevalent beliefs within the United States, the majority of
Muslims do not practice FGM.273 Female circumcision is not encouraged by or even
mentioned in the Qur’an and is not a religious ritual.274 Although there are Muslims
that do specifically endorse and perform female circumcision based on false religious
precepts, the act is more of a cultural rite of passage for women who are subjugated
to men.275 For example, there are Christian cultures in Africa that also practice the
procedure.276 As the fifth Congressional finding states, “the practice of female
genital mutilation can be prohibited without abridging the exercise of any rights
guaranteed under the first amendment to the Constitution.”277 This statute was
broadly intended to encompass FGM regardless of any potential religious pretext as
a means to protect health interests of women.278
No conclusive evidence indicates that FGM is a religious based ritual. Nor is
there any suggestion that Congress intended to curtail FGM as a religious belief or
practice. Accordingly, the statute is not likely to be overturned as a violation of the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.
Recognizing that there may be a small minority group that believes FGM to be a
religious-based Islamic rite and accordingly challenge the statute as violating Free
Exercise rights, the constitutional challenge could be appropriately rejected using the
Oregon Employment rationale. In that case, the court upheld the denial of
unemployment benefits to two individuals who had been terminated from their jobs
for using illegal substances.279 The Native Americans sought to challenge the state’s
action on free exercise grounds because their religious beliefs and conduct
pleasure of males who prefer tightness, and perhaps to a much lesser extent for some groups,
religion.
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incorporate the use of peyote.280 Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the state of
Oregon classified the drug as a controlled substance and was within its rights to do
so.281 The United States Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the Oregon law
was valid and constitutional, even though the general application of the laws
incidentally infringed upon religious rights.282
The federal ban on FGM is only perceived as a violation of the First Amendment
by those adhering to the common misperceptions regarding FGM’s origins and
rationales. But even if FGM were found to be a religious ritual, the federal ban was
not intended to target any religious group. Furthermore, Congress’ purposes in
enacting the statute were to protect the health of women which is severely impacted
by their genitals being cut. Thus, this statute can serve as a model for New York’s
legislative bodies. However, it should be re-emphasized that any state or federal ban
of oral-suction is going to be a direct hit to the targeted fundamental right of Jews to
practice metzitzah be’peh, and it should be expected that any state action will be
strictly scrutinized by the Court.
VII. CONCLUSION
During an election year, Mayor Bloomberg of New York City temporarily tabled
a conflicting issue between the government and a large voting bloc, the Orthodox
Jewish community, even after identifying three documented cases since 2003 where
Jewish infants had been afflicted with neonatal herpetic infections following
metzitzah be’peh. After Bloomberg’s successful re-election, the city renewed its
interest in the ongoing debate over metzitzah be’peh and announced the discovery of
two more infected infants bringing the total to five babies since 2003.283 One of
these fragile infants died; another infant experienced brain damage. The remaining
three infants experienced signs, symptoms, and results of HSV within the possible
spectrum of effects.
The common cold sore virus (oral type I Herpes) is seemingly harmless, and for
many adults and perhaps even mohels, it is an aesthetic nuisance often disregarded.
Oral herpes viruses are readily spread through the lesions in and around the lips and
mouth, particularly to the freshly cut genitalia of eight-day old infants taking part in
the ritual covenant with God. Medical evidence suggests a strong connection
between oral-genital suction and the transmission of herpes to Jewish infants.
Herpes is incurable. There may be limited treatments to ease the lifelong
recurrent discomfort that many infected individuals will experience, but the infection
is permanent. Like a game of chance, there is no way of knowing who will be
asymptomatic or how severely a neonate may be affected. The point is simply this:
it is the most common ulcerative STD and neonatal infection can range from fatal to
asymptomatic with a wide variety of developmental defects and associated ailments
in between. Herpes is incurable.
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It is estimated that approximately 4000 rituals involving metzitzah be’peh are
performed each year in highly Orthodox Jewish communities in New York. Those
that resist any form of regulation, government interference, or modification of the
ancient ritual of oral suction base their claims on two grounds. First, that oral
suction is a necessary component to effectuate the bond between the child and God.
And second, that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
religious freedom. Most Jews have long abandoned metzitzah be’peh in the absence
any express instruction for the ritual within the Talmud, or have modified the ritual
suctioning of blood to be done via a glass tube.
Oral-suction proponents’ first argument fails. As evidenced by the majority of
Jewish followers that have abandoned direct mouth to penis contact, Judaic Law
does not expressly mandate the use of metzitzah be’peh to effectuate a covenant
between the child and God. Their second argument also fails. While the First
Amendment absolutely guarantees freedom of religious belief, religious actions
based on those beliefs are not absolutely protected. As the United States Supreme
Court held in Hialeah, government action that interferes with the free exercise of
religion must meet strict scrutiny, and in the rare instance that it does meet this
standard, it will be constitutionally valid.
The City of New York can and should ban metzitzah be’peh. The city has a
compelling interest to protect the health and welfare of the estimated 4000 infants
that are at a high risk of exposure to herpes during the oral suction ritual. Since one
of five infants has died as a result of neonatal HSV, and a second of the five has
experienced brain damage from HSV, the nature of the risk is clear. Furthermore,
HSV is permanent and incurable. It will ail these infants for the rest of their lives
and potentially impair their early development. These infants will grow into sexually
mature adults, running the risk of spreading HSV to others. New York has an
interest of the highest order to protect the lives of innocent infants. The interest is
compelling and legitimate. New York would be neglecting its duty to regulate for
the health and welfare of these infants by turning their backs on the opportunity to
end such a dangerous religious ritual.
New York City’s health department issued its most recent statement in December
warning the community of the dangerous nature of metzitzah be’peh. This
government action has been attacked by the disappointed voting bloc. Bloomberg
assigned the investigation to a Rabbinical Judicial board for further investigating
pending an update in early December.284 When the Rabbis failed to meet
Bloomberg’s deadline to report their progress and findings with respect to the three
HSV cases associated with one particular mohel, the statement was released. This
preliminary action is to be followed by guidelines that the health department is
currently drafting.
Guidelines will not prevent another infected mohel from applying his infected
mouth to the freshly cut penis of an eight day old baby boy for the purposes of
metzitzah be’peh.285 There is no penalty attached and guidelines have no
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Steven I. Weiss, Rabbi Targeted After Call for Bris Change. FORWARD, Mar. 18, 2005,
available at http://forward.com/articles/2834. The article cites two Jewish publications, Yated
Ne’eman and Der Yid, as vowing that “members of their communities will continue to
practice the controversial ritual, even if doing so lands them in prison.” This suggests that
neither regulation by the Jewish community nor criminal sanctions by the government will
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enforcement power. While a city or state ban on oral suction may not permanently
end the risk posed to infants, since some traditional Orthodox mohels’ belief in the
practice is so deeply rooted that they will continue to practice it at any cost. But
such a regulation will at least establish a recognized penalty or consequence for
infecting an innocent infant.286 It is the duty of New York City to enact legislation
that protects the health interests of these at-risk infants. Should the city decide to
move beyond the proposed solution of setting forth unenforceable guidelines, the
city should be confident that their legislation will meet the requirements of strict
scrutiny in the wake of Hialeah and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
JAMIE COLE KERLEE287

inhibit the oral suction ritual. However, criminal penalties are traditionally recognized as
being deterrents to criminal activity.
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As a Mom, I was compelled to face this issue. Zachary and Madeleine, you both inspire
me to work hard, and I thank you both for your patience. A special thank you to my parents,
Jim and Danielle Cole, who made my journey through law school possible.

